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COMMENTS
The Sinking Shipping Industry*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has yet to develop a coordinated national ship-
ping policy despite constant calls for a strong merchant marine dating
from the country's inception.' The lack of such a policy implicates
broader national interests than those of shippers and ship-owners, such
as the national defense, diplomatic relations with United States trading
partners, and the United States balance of payments.2 In 1950, the
United States ranked second only to the United Kingdom in both
number of ships and deadweight tonnage (a measure of ship carrying
capacity); however, in 1970, it ranked eighth in number and sixth in
size among world merchant marines.3 Today, the United States flag
fleet carries an estimated 4.1% of United States waterborne trade.4
These statistics demonstrate the depths to which the United States ship-
* Winner, 1983 Lowden-Wigmore Prize. Northwestern University School of Law annually
awards the Lowden-Wigmore Prize to the best student contribution to each of its legal
publications.
I George Washington was the first president to express the need for maintaining a strong
United States merchant marine: "I recommend it to your serious recollection how far and in what
mode, it may be expedient to guard against embarrassments from these contingencies, by such
encouragements to our own Navigation as will render our commerce and agriculture less depen-
dent on foreign bottoms .. " President George Washington, Second Annual Address to Con-
gress, Dec. 8, 1790, quoted in I. HEINE, THE U.S. MARITIME INDUSTRY-IN THE NATIONAL
INTEREST 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MARITIME INDUSTRY].
2 The private merchant marine is the fourth arm of the United States national defense sys-
tem. The contribution of the shipping industry to the balance of payments may become more
important because of the increasing United States trade deficit. See MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra
note 1, at 337-38. "The dramatic decline in the percentage of our commerce carried on U.S.-flag
vessels has added to our balance of payments deficit." HousE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE &
FISHERIES, SHIPPING ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 232, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 232].
3 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note I, at 259-60.
4 Id. at 253. This is an estimate of 1978 trade. In the same year, ships carried 61.7% of
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ping industry has descended. This severe decline is due to fragmented
and outdated legislation incapable of dealing with problems which the
industry is currently experiencing. The present regulatory system is
based on an antitrust philosophy which puts the United States flag fleet
at a competitive disadvantage because it fails adequately to take ac-
count of the industry's present structure and operation. A coordinated
national shipping and cargo policy designed to reverse the industry's
downward trend is needed.
The strength of the United States merchant marine will depend on
its ability to contend with each of the factors contributing to the indus-
try's decline. After an explanation of the industry's organization, this
comment will examine the present regulatory scheme, devoting special
attention to the liner shipping industry and its antitrust exemption.5
Next, a critical analysis of industry problems will be presented.' A
presentation of components of a coordinated national shipping and
cargo policy follows the analysis of industry problems.7
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT REGULATORY SYSTEM
A. Background on the Shipping Industry
Liners serving on United States foreign trade' routes operate as
either conference members or independents. Shipping conferences are
"agreements organized by shipping lines to restrict or eliminate compe-
tition, to regulate and rationalize sailing schedules and ports of call,
and occasionally to arrange for the pooling of cargo, freight monies, or
United States foreign trade, airplanes carried 14.1% and the remaining 24.2% was carried by other
means (principally railroads, pipelines and trucks). Id. at 75.
The statistics cited in the text demonstrate that the industry is back where it was in 1910 when
"94% of the entire exports and imports of the United States [were] carried in foreign ships, under
the flags of foreign nations who [were] our rivals in trade and possible enemies in war." House
Joint Resolution 230 of 1910, quoted in Mason, The Relationship and Parallel Development of Eco-
nomic Regulation andAntitrust Enforcement in the Ocean Common Carrier Industry, in PROCEED-
INGS: IN SEARCH OF A RATIONAL LINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY 7 (Northwestern University
Transportation Center 1978) [hereinafter cited as LINER SHIPPING].
5 See infra notes 34-102 and accompanying text. Liner shipping service is regularly sched-
uled sailings by an ocean carrier on an established trade route. Liners are common carriers and
accept cargo on a first-come, first-served basis.
6 See infra notes 103-97 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
8 United States foreign trade may consist of both American-built ships and foreign-built
ships, if they are employed exclusively in foreign trade. Domestic waterborne trade, on the other
hand, is reserved for American-built and -manned ships. Act of August 24, 1912, ch. 390, § 5, 37
Stat. 560, 562 as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 11 (1976), repealedby Act of Dec. 24, 1980, Pub. L. 96-594,
tit. I, § 127, 94 Stat. 3459, 3459. Cabotage (carriage of goods or passengers for remuneration taken
on at one point and discharged at another point within the territory of the same country) laws of
this type are common among maritime nations. MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 379-80.
The Sinking Shipping Industry
5:99(1983)
net earnings."9 Shipping lines created conferences in response to com-
petitive conditions which prevailed in the late 1800s.11 During this pe-
riod, the supply of shipping greatly exceeded the demand due to the
enormous growth of tonnage in previous years. Cutthroat competition
followed, reducing freight rates to unremunerative levels." As a result,
service was disrupted and some lines failed; however, their ships re-
mained and the excess supply continued.' 2 In response, surviving ship-
ping lines pooled their resources, made special contracts with large
shippers, and formed organizations to regulate the trade and eliminate
competition. It is generally believed that the first conference agreement
was the Calcutta Conference, formed in 1875 by liner companies en-
gaged in trade to that port from the United Kingdom. The European
outbound trades'3 were the first to be organized.' 4 In 1979, approxi-
mately 350 conferences and agreements existed.' 5
Conferences vary as to type and purpose. Some conferences are
created to discuss or resolve specific shipping matters of concern to
their members, while each member continues to publish its own tariff.16
In other conferences, members are parties to a common tariff and meet
9 D. MARX, INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CARTELS: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL SELF-REGULA-
TION BY SHIPPING CONFERENCES 3 (1953).
10 Id. at 46.
11 The industry's cost structure makes it susceptible to this destructive competition.
The crucial fact. . . is that, once a vessel has been scheduled by a liner operator. . ., a large
proportion of the total expenses of the voyage has become fixed, and until the vessel is loaded
'full and down' it will be remunerative for that vessel to carry any additional cargo that can
be procured so long as it pays anything in excess of the actual out-of-pocket expenses in-
volved. In trades where the flow of commerce is not balanced-and this is the case more
often than not ... liners. . . will be tempted to engaged in cutthroat competition at least on
the leg of the voyage on which cargo is light.
D. MARX, supra note 9, at 21.
12 Id.
13 Conferences generally restrict their activities to traffic between two geographic areas or
ranges. Inbound and outbound segments of the trade are considered as separate trades. There-
fore, separate conferences are usually formed to cover inward and outward operations, though
some conferences cover traffic moving in both directions. Large companies operating worldwide
will be a member of numerous conferences, generally one for every route on which it operates a
liner service. Id. at 137-38; S. LAWRENCE, UNITED STATES MERCHANT SHIPPING POLICIES AND
POLITICS 14 (1966).
14 D. MARX , supra note 9, at 46-47. For a more detailed discussion of shipping industry
economics and conferences, see generally Agman, Competition, Rationalization, and the United
States Shipping Policy, 8 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1976); Bennathan & Walters, Shipping Conferences:
An Economic Analysis, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 93 (1972); Comment, Antitrust and the Shipping
Industry: Interpretation of the ShipingAct of 1916, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 115 (1979-80)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Antitrust & the Shpping Industry].
15 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 80.
16 Tariffs are rate schedules in the shipping industry which list cargo and the freight rate to be
charged for its carriage.
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frequently to consider freight rates and other matters of concern.'
7
Since conferences were created to provide stability, they must exert
control over competition. Control may be acquired by using a com-
mon tariff whereby each member charges the same freight rates,
thereby eliminating price competition between member lines; or by
limiting the number of sailings per vessel, thereby limiting available
carrying capacity on the trade.'8 However, conferences are still faced
with competition from: (1) independent or non-conference liners oper-
ating in the same area, but who may or may not charge the conference
rates;' 9 (2) tramps20 which compete primarily for commodities moving
in bulk and whose presence may cause conferences to exempt certain
goods from its rate agreement;2' (3) other conferences serving as alter-
nate routes or markets; and (4) private or industrial carriers.22 This
competition serves as a check on conference abuse of rate-making
power, but also threatens the long-term commitment that conference
members have made to their trade.
The conference system encourages the revenue-producing stability
which shipping lines require to finance the regular frequent sailings
they offer to shippers and to justify investment in new and improved
services to shippers. 23 To ensure sufficient cargo for members, confer-
ences provide "incentives" for shippers to use only conference liners.
These loyalty agreements take different forms. For example, a shipper
requiring the services provided by a conference liner will enter into a
deferred rebate agreement which obligates him to utilize conference
17 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 80.
18 Id. at 22.
19 D. MARX, supra note 9, at 23.
20 Tramp carriers have irregular schedules and routes, switching routes as profitability
changes. They generally accept cargo only in amounts sufficient to fill their vessels.
21 The tramp charges rates below the conference rate to attract sufficient cargo to fill the ves-
sel. The conference must meet this price or lose cargo. That is why rates for certain commodities
are left open, that is, subject to negotiation. Tramp cargoes consist mainly of commodities which
are available for shipment in full cargo lots, of relatively great bulk or weight, capable of being
transported with no exceptional facilities of the carrier for handling or preserving the cargo, and
valued low enough so that the cheapness of the transport outweighs the value of speed and regu-
larity of delivery. D. MARX, supra note 9, at 224. The last characteristic is a reference to the
pricing method used in the industry, which is charging what the traffic will bear or price discrimi-
nation. In effect, finished goods pay higher rates than semi-finished goods, which pay higher rates
than raw materials. The first two are considered high-rated cargo, and the last one, low-rated
cargo. Id. at 28.
22 J. WALGREEN, THE ECONOMICS OF OCEAN LINER FREIGHT CONFERENCES 87-89 (1965).
Private carriers are owned by firms whose main business is not shipping. They provide shipping
services for their owners, but may compete with conferences by operating as common carriers on
one leg of their trips. Id.
23 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 80.
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liners exclusively.24 During a specified period, if the shipper violates
the agreement and utilizes non-conference liners, he loses his right to
the rebate (usually five or ten percent), not only for shipments made
during that period but also for shipments made during the previous
period.25 Another exclusive patronage device is the dual rate system.
In return for the shipper's exclusive patronage on a specified route, the
conference bills the shipper at contract rates lower than those specified
in the tariff applicable to shippers who do not sign dual rate contracts.26
A shipper may be liable for liquidated damages for a contract
violation.
Conferences may be either open or closed. United States confer-
ences must be open.' Membership is open to any carrier, foreign or
domestic, able to satisfy requirements promulgated by the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC).28 By contrast, the rest of the world op-
erates under a system of closed conferences.29  Members of a closed
conference decide whether to admit new members. As a consequence,
closed conferences exercise tighter control over the amount of available
cargo space. Such control over cargo space puts the closed conference
in a better position to prevent overtonnaging (excess cargo space) and
the accompanying cutthroat competition. If the conference members
feel that an additional shipping line on the trade would produce excess
cargo space, then the members refuse to accept a new member. If the
line still wishes to serve the trade route, it can enter as an independent.
However, the line will face problems attracting cargo because most
closed conferences employ the deferred rebate.3 Another device of
24 Deferred rebates are prohibited on United States trades. 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1976). This
method is thought by shipping lines to be the most effective device for control of the trade, al-
though shippers view it as a kind of bondage. D. MARX, supra note 9, at 55, 202. 'They are
prohibited in United States trades because of the fear that conferences may retaliate against ship-
pers for violating agreements. Such retaliation could be disastrous to shippers since independents
cannot provide the frequent regular service they require. Id. at 55. See infra notes 34-49 and
accompanying text.
25 Generally, the initial rebate period runs three, six or twelve months; and the deferment
period runs an additional three or six months. D. MARX, supra note 9, at 55.
26 Id. at 201. In United States trades, the percentage discount between the contract rate and
the tariff is limited to 15%. 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1976).
27 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976).
28 46 C.F.R. § 523 (1976). The FMC administers the Shipping Act of 1916, see infra notes 34-
88 and accompanying text. The FMC had five predecessors: the Federal Maritime Board (1950-
1961), the United States Maritime Commission (1936-1950), the Shipping Board Bureau of the
Department of Commerce (1933-1936), and the Shipping Board (1916-1933). To avoid confusion,
they will all be subsumed under FMC.
29 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 82.
30 Id See also supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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closed conferences to avoid overtonnaging is the use of "fighting
ships." When an independent enters the trade, it must undercut the
conference rate to attract cargo. In response, a closed conference may
place a fighting ship on the trade to compete with the independent by
sailing at the same time with rates so low that the independent no
longer finds it profitable to remain on the trade.32 Losses from the
fighting ship's operation are divided among conference members.33
B. The Shipping Act of 1916 and Its Interpretation
-. General Regulatory Scheme
The Shipping Act of 191614 is the basic regulatory instrument for
liner shipping on United States trades. Congress passed the Act after a
full investigation, by the House of Representatives Committee on
Merchant Marines and Fisheries, into the shipping industry and its use
of the conference system." Several factors necessitated the investiga-
tion. First, industry concentration increased through mergers and as-
sociations, facilitating the formation of more closely knit conferences.
Although conferences were initially formed as a defensive mechanism,
Congress questioned their willingness to remain defensive in nature
rather than turn aggressive and extort shippers. Second, shippers com-
plained about alleged discriminatory practices, particularly the de-
ferred rebate.3 6 Finally, in 1911, the Department of Justice filed suits
against three conferences, alleging that the granting of deferred rebates
violated the antitrust laws, but the cases were mooted by World War1.37
Both the United Kingdom's Royal Commission Report and the
Alexander Report favored the conference system over free competi-
32 Because of their discriminatory character, fighting ships are prohibited in United States
trades. 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1976). See also infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
33 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 82. If the independent is not driven out of the trade,
it may be admitted to the conference as the conference may be unable to sustain the fighting ship's
losses.
34 Ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728, codfed at 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-842 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
35 HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON STEAMSHIP AGREE-
MENTS AND APPLICATION IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC TRADE, H.R. Doc. No.
805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER REPORT]. Prior to the Alexander
Report, the United Kingdom undertook a similar investigation into its own shipping industry.
ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT ON SHIPPING RINGS, CMD. Nos. 4668, 4685 (1909) [hereinafter cited
as ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT]. For a general discussion of both investigations, see D. MARX,
supra note 9, at 49-67.
36 D. MARX, supra note 9, at 47-50.
37 Id. The cases were: United States v. Hamburg-American Co., 239 U.S. 466 (1916); United
States v. American-Asiatic Steamship Co., 242 U.S. 537 (1917); United States v. Prince Line Ltd.,
242 U.S. 537 (1917).
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tion.3s The Alexander Report found the advantages of the conference
system to be: (1) greater regularity of sailings; (2) improved ship con-
struction and capacity made possible by the security which conferences
gave to the capital invested in the business; (3) uniformity of rates to all
shippers, regardless of economic strength; (4) reduction of costs by
eliminating wasteful competition between member lines through regu-
lation of tonnage and sailing dates; (5) charging what the traffic will
bear since conferences could charge lower rates for goods where a
higher rate would bear too heavily, and secure compensation on goods
whose value justified a higher rate; and (6) preservation of weaker lines
by preventing a "survival of the fittest" result which is inevitable in
unrestricted competition.39 Disadvantages described in the Alexander
Report emphasized the monopolistic nature of conference agreements,
the arbitrariness of rate increases often made without sufficient notice,
the secrecy with which conferences operated, and the unavailability of
tariffs.40
Notwithstanding the disadvantages of the conference system, the
Alexander Report recognized the necessity of the conference system to
secure its advantages for shippers and to enable United States carriers
and products to compete on a parity with their foreign counterparts.4 '
Despite its sanctioning of conferences, the Committee recommended
government supervision of conference practices.42 This report became
the basis for the Shipping Act of 1916.
The Shipping Act applies only to common carriers,43 and not to
tramps and private carriers. The Act prohibits deferred rebates,' fight-
ing ships,45 retaliation or discrimination against any shipper, and un-
fair or unjustly discriminatory contracts with any shipper.4 6 Further, it
38 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 35, at 78, 114; ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note
35, at 416.
39 ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 35, at 295-303. See D. MARX, supra note 9, at 56-66, for a
comparison of the advantages and disadvantages found by the Alexander Report and the Royal
Commission Report.
40 ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 35, at 415-19.
41 The Committee found that self-regulation through conferences was a universal practice
among other maritime nations and that on most routes to and from the United States, conference
lines enjoyed a virtual monopoly. Id. at 415-17.
42 ALEXANDER REPORT, supra note 35, at 307, 417. The Royal Commission, on the other
hand, opposed government interference with such a complex multinational industry. ROYAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 35, at 81-84. Rather, the Royal Commission recommended in-
tervention only when national interests were threatened. Id. at 89.
43 46 U.S.C. §§ 801, 842 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
44 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
45 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
46 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1976). Violations are punishable by a maximum fine of $25,000 per day
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is unlawful to: (1) unreasonably prefer any particular person, locality,
or description of traffic, or to subject any of the foregoing to undue
disadvantage; (2) permit transportation by less than the going rate
through false billing, weighing, or other unfair means; (3) induce
marine insurance companies to discriminate against a competitor;47
and (4) disclose information detrimental to shippers or consignees.48
Common carriers must file and observe just and reasonable rates which
can be changed only after ten days notice.49
2. Antitrust Exemption
Perhaps the most important provision of the Shipping Act, and
certainly the one that has generated the most controversy, is section
15.50 Section 15 requires carriers subject to the Act to file with the
FMC all agreements, understandings, conferences or other arrange-
ments between carriers which affect competition or change earlier
agreements. The FMC may disapprove, cancel, or modify any agree-
ment or modification which it finds operates to the detriment of United
States commerce, violates the Act, or is "unjustly discriminatory or un-
fair."'5 1 Section 15 further provides that conferences in United States
trades shall be open, that conference agreements shall include provi-
sions for self-policing of members, and that approved agreements shall
be exempt from the Sherman Act and any supplemental antitrust
laws. 52 Antitrust immunity is granted only to approved agreements;
disapproved agreements are unlawful.53 The operative language of sec-
tion 15 requires the FMC to approve all agreements which do not fall
within the specific prohibitions.54 Violators are subject to a civil pen-
for each offense. Id. If the FMC finds that any carrier, which is not a citizen of the United States,
violated § 14 or denied an American common carrier admission to a conference on equal terms
with all other parties, the Commissioner of Customs is authorized to bar the vessels of the offender
from United States ports. 46 U.S.C. § 813 (1976).
47 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1976) (covering the first three prohibitions).
48 46 U.S.C. § 819 (1976).
49 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1976). If the FMC finds any rate to be unreasonable, it has power to set a
reasonable rate, or to disapprove rates it finds to be so high or low as to be detrimental to United
States commerce; however, the FMC plays no role in the original setting of rates. Id.




54 Section 15 in pertinent part provides:
Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this Act, shall file immediately
with the Commission a true copy, or, if oral, a true and complete memorandum, of every
agreement with another such carrier or other person subject to this Act, or modification or
cancellation thereof, to which it may be a party or conform in whole or in part, fixing or
regulating transportation rates or fares; giving or receiving special rates, accommodations, or.
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alty of not more than $1,000 for each day the violation continues.55
It is significant that the Alexander Report, which recommended
exemption for conference agreements, was produced by the same Con-
gress that enacted both the Clayton Act 56 and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.57 Even in an era absorbed with the promotion of free
competition, the Committee recognized that there are circumstances
under which free competition will not operate in the best interests of
58participants and consumers.
From the passage of the Shipping Act to the early 1950s, no ship-
ping-related cases were brought under the antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court, using what later became known as the doctrine of primary juris-
diction,5 9 held that private parties could not maintain an action for in-
junctive relief under the Clayton Act, even though the challenged dual
rate contract had not been approved .6  Later, the Court held that the
other special privileges or advantages; controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying com-
petition; pooling or apportioning earnings, losses, or traffic; allotting ports or restricting or
otherwise regulating the number and character of sailings between ports; limiting or regulat-
ing in any way the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic to be carried; or in any
manner providing for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement. The
term "agreement" in this section includes understandings, conferences, and other arrange-
ments.
The Commission shall by order, after notice and hearing, disapprove, cancel or modify
any agreement, or any modification or cancellation thereof, whether or not previously ap-
proved by it, that it finds to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between carriers, shippers,
exporters, importers, or ports, or between exporters from the United States and their foreign
competitors, or to operate to the detriment of the commerce of the United States, or to be
contrary to the public interest, or to be in violation of this Act, and shall approve all other
agreements, modifications, or cancellations.
Id.
55 Id.
56 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
57 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
58 In fact, during World War I, the United States government made shipbuilding contracts for
a large number of ships to meet the needs of the war. The majority of the ships, however, were not
delivered until after the war ended. The government then had the responsibility of running a
shipping line until private purchasers could be found. To do so, the United States itself organized
and promoted conferences to obtain rate stability necessary for successful operation. For a com-
plete discussion, see MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note I, at 7; D. MARX, supra note 9, at 126-30.
59 The Court in Cunard used the term "exclusive primary jurisdiction." United States Navi-
gation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474, 485 (1932). This is the same as primary juris-
diction, which is:
concerned with promoting proper relationships between courts and administrative agencies
charged with particular regulatory duties .... Primary jurisdiction". . applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the
claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.
United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956).
60 United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932). The Court
unanimously affirmed lower court holdings that the matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the FMC. Id. at 486.
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government (Department of Justice) was also barred from bringing
such a suit.6 The Court dealt with the issue of unapproved agreements
by resort to primary jurisdiction which required the FMC to review the
contract before a court could do so. 62 Remedies for unapproved activi-
ties arguably within the scope of section 15 had to be found within the
provisions of the Shipping Act.
Dual rate contracts of the type challenged in United States Naviga-
tion Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co .63 and Far East Conference v. United
States64 were not expressly permitted by the Shipping Act, nor were
they expressly prohibited.65  Evidently, the FMC assumed that ap-
proval of a shipping rate conference implicitly authorized the use of
dual rate contracts. That assumption, combined with what one com-
mentator has termed "the reality of Commission inaction, ' 66 led to
abuse of the dual rate system.67
Constant challenges to the use of dual rate contracts gave rise to
Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co.,68 the first case to address
the issue of dual rate contracts in the context of an approved agree-
ment. The Supreme Court held that the FMC lacked power to approve
the questioned dual rate system. The Court used the FMC's findings
approving the agreement to reach this conclusion, stating:
Since the Board found that the dual-rate contract of the conference was
"a necessary competitive measure to offset the effect of non-conference
competition" required "to meet the competition of Isbrandtsen in order to
obtain for its members a greater participation in the cargo moving in this
trade," it follows that the contract was a "resort to other discriminating or
unfair methods" to stifle outside competition in violation of § 14 Third
[paragraph].6 9
A dual rate contract with no anticompetitive animus would be legal. In
effect, however, this was aper se prohibition since every dual rate con-
tract is intended to "stifle outside competition." This decision struck a
61 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). The Department of Justice
brought suit against the Far Eastern conference on the grounds that its exclusive patronage con-
tract violated the antitrust laws and the Shipping Act. The Supreme Court reversed a lower court
holding that conference agreements containing the dual rate system were not illegal in themselves
and therefore required a trial on the merits, and that the courts had jurisdiction to hear such cases.
62 United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. at 486.
63 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
64 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
65 Subsequently, they were legalized by the 1961 Amendments to the Shipping Act. Act of
October 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-346, § 1, 75 Stat. 762, 762, codfiedat 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1976). See
also infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
66 Llorca,Anti-trust Exemption of Shipping Conferences, 6 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 287, 294 (1975).
67 Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 HARV. L. REv. 635, 640 (1965).
68 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
69 Id. at 493.
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severe blow to the conference system, for it raised serious doubts as to
the validity of any of the exclusive patronage/dual rate contract sys-
tems then being used by over 113 conferences serving United States
ports.
70
The conferences turned to Congress for relief. Congress re-
sponded by imposing a moratorium authorizing the use of dual rate
contracts. 7 ' After exhaustive hearings, 72 Congress enacted the Ship-
ping Act amendments of 196 173 which, in effect, reaffirmed the original
findings of the Alexander Report "that some monopoly in ocean ship-
ping is necessary but that it must be regulated to prevent abuses. 74 It
was clear, however, that the "antitrust advocates had lost the battle."
75
As enacted, the 1961 statute amended section 14 to require ap-
proval of dual rate contracts unless they were found to be "detrimental
to the commerce of the United States, or contrary to the public interest,
or unjustly discriminatory or unfair as between shippers, exporters, im-
porters, or ports."'76 Section 15 was amended to permit disapproval of
70 Fawcett & Nolan, United States Ocean Shipping: The History, Development, and Decline of
the Conference Antitrust Exemption, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 537, 547 (1979).
71 Actually, there was an original authorization, followed by a series of extensions. Act of
August 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-626, 72 Stat. 574, extended by Act of June 29, 1960, Pub. L. No.
86-542, 74 Stat. 253 and Act of June 21, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-55, 75 Stat. 195.
72 At least three investigations were conducted. Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries:
Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Ocean Freight In-
dustry, 86th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1959-60); HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHER-
IES, PROVIDING FOR THE OPERATION OF STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES, H.R. REP. No. 498, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1961) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 498]; SENATE COMM. OF COMMERCE,
STEAMSHIP CONFERENCES AND DUAL RATE CONTRACTS, S. REP. No. 860, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 860]. The House and Senate Reports resulted in the
Shipping Act Amendments of 1961. Although the work of the Antitrust Subcommittee did not
result in legislation, recognition was given to its views of the applicability of antitrust laws to the
shipping industry in the House and Senate Reports but was rejected.
73 Act of October 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-346, 75 Stat. 762. For detailed discussion of the
legislative history, see SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, INDEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE STEAMSHIP CONFERENCE/DUAL RATE LAW, S. Doc. No. 100, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962);
Fawcett & Nolan, supra note 70, at 547-5 1; Note, supra note 67, at 639-42.
74 Note, supra note 67, at 641. There are differing viewpoints as to the intent of Congress in
enacting these amendments. See Fawcett & Nolan, supra note 70, at 551; Llorca, supra note 66, at
295 (1975) (Llorca, as well as Fawcett & Nolan, views the amendments as removing the confer-
ence system from the reach of antitrust laws in favor of an independent regulatory agency.); Pan-
sius, Plotting the Return of Isbrandtsen: The Illegality of Interconference Rate Agreements, 9
TRANSP. L. J. 337, 345 (1977) (expressing the view that the immunity granted was only the mini-
mum necessary to preserve the conference system); Note, supra note 67, at 642 (expressing the
view that no new balance had been struck between competition and regulation).
75 Fawcett & Nolan, supra note 70, at 551. Subsequent events as set forth below indicate that
they may be winning the war.
76 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1976).
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agreements contrary to the public interest.77 Under section 18, confer-
ences were required to establish, file, and observe tariffs, with increases
to take effect only after thirty days public notice. The FMC was given
the power under section 18(b)(5) of the original Act to disapprove rates
so unreasonably high or low as to be detrimental to United States
commerce.
78
Although the 1961 Amendments may not have clarified the status
of the antitrust exemption, it was clear that any immunity would be
subject to careful control because of the FMC's broadened authority to
disapprove agreements under section 15. The question of the effect of
FMC approval on the legality of agreements remained unresolved.
The Supreme Court had consistently held79 that the remedy for activi-
ties which allegedly violated the Shipping Act had to be found within
the Act itself.8° However, in 1966, the Court, contrary to ten years of
precedent, reversed the dismissal of a treble damage action based on
injuries allegedly resulting from a section 15 rate-making agreement.8'
In Carnation Co. v. Westbound Conference, the Court reexamined its
earlier position, and concluded that Congress did not intend to grant
the industry total antitrust immunity.82 The Court held that action
taken under rate-making agreements not filed with or approved by the
FMC was subject to antitrust liability.8 3 In other words, there was no
need to defer to the FMC since it did not have the power to approve
agreements which violated the Act.
Carnation established the antitrust laws as an alternative regula-
tory scheme. The FMC soon followed the Court's lead by incorporat-
ing antitrust considerations into the Shipping Act itself.84 To achieve
77 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976).
78 46 U.S.C. § 817 (1976).
'79 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
80 The Act makes it unlawful to carry out agreements under sections 14b or 15 if they have not
been approved or if they have been disapproved by the FMC. Section 15 provides a civil penalty
for such violations. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976).
81 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, modified by 383 U.S. 932
(1966).
82 Id. at 216-20.
83 Id. at 216. The conferences operated under an agreement approved by the FMC and an
interconference agreement providing for joint rate setting which was also approved. However, the
complaint charged that the defendants entered a secret rate fixing agreement which was beyond
the scope of the approved agreements and that any action taken under the secret agreement was
not exempt from the antitrust laws. See generally Fremlin, Primary Jurisdiction and the Federal
Maritime Commission, 18 HASTINGS L. J. 733, 763 (1967). It should also be noted that the FMC
had defended its jurisdiction and the conferences' position in the lower courts, but it switched
sides before the Supreme Court. Fawcett & Nolan, supra note 70, at 553 n.80.
84 For a discussion of what may have led the FMC to introduce this new element, see Fawcett
& Nolan, supra note 70, at 557-59.
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this result, in its own proceedings, the FMC construed the "public in-
terest" test (added by the 1961 Amendments) as encompassing antitrust
considerations, and placed the burden of justifying an agreement upon
its proponents."- Although the FMC had consistently held that confer-
ence agreements were to be disapproved only when they operated in a
manner prohibited by section 15, it reversed the hearing examiner's
finding that the agreements in question were not contrary to Shipping
Act standards.8 6 However, the FMC held that the proponents carried
their burden. Therefore, there was no immediate challenge to this new
formulation of the public interest test.
The Supreme Court accepted the FMC's interpretation when it
was challenged 7 by holding that the FMC was required to consider the
antitrust laws before approving an agreement under section 15.8
85 Mediterranean Pools Investigation, 9 F.M.C. 264 (1966).
86 Id. at 294. The FMC explained the shift in position as follows:
For presumptively, all anticompetitive combinations run counter to the public interest in free
and open competition and it is incumbent upon those who seek exemption of anticompetitive
combinations under section 15 to demonstrate that the combination seeks to eliminate or
remedy conditions which preclude or hinder the achievement of the regulatory purposes of
the Shipping Act.
Id. at 289-90.
87 Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Svenska]. The Supreme Court restated the standard as follows:
The Commission has formulated a rule that conference restraints which interfere with the
policies of antitrust laws will be approved only if the conference can "bring forth such facts as
would demonstrate that the. . . rule was required by a serious transportation need, necessary
to secure important public benefits or in furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the
Shipping Act."
By its very nature an illegal restraint of trade is in some ways "contrary to the public inter-
est," and the Commission's antitrust standard, involving an assessment of the necessity for
this restraint in terms of legitimate commercial objectives, simply gives understandable con-
tent to the broad statutory concept of the "public interest."
The Commission's approach does not make the promise of antitrust immunity meaningless
because a restraint that would violate the antitrust laws will still be approved whenever a
sufficient justification for it exists. Nor does the Commission's test, by requiring the confer-
ence to come forward with a justification for the restraint, improperly shift the burden of
proof. The Commission must of course adduce substantial evidence to support a finding
under one of the four standards of § 15, but once an antitrust violation is established, this
alone will normally constitute substantial evidence that the agreement is "contrary to the
public interest," unless other evidence in the record fairly detracts from the weight of this
factor. . . . We therefore hold that the antitrust test formulated by the Commission is an
appropriate refinement of the statutory "public interest" standard.
Id. at 243-46 (citations omitted).
88 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261, 273-74
(1968). In this case, the Supreme Court reversed the FMC and held that certain components of a
union contract with the Pacific Maritime Association had to be filed with and approved by the
FMC. In return for consenting to the use of labor saving devices, the Warehousemen's Union
required PMA to create a $29,000,000 fund to mitigate the effect of technological unemployment.
Raising this fund was left to PMA's discretion. It was the formula used for assessing the contribu-
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3. Recent Amendments to the Shioping Act
a. The Ocean Shipping Act of 19789
This Act, also known as the Controlled Carrier Bill, amends sec-
tions 1 and 18 of the Shipping Act of 1916 to establish the category of
regulated carriers termed controlled carriers. Controlled carriers are
defined in the Ocean Shipping Act as common carriers by water in
United States foreign commerce whose operating assets are directly or
indirectly owned or controlled by the government whose flag it flies.90
This legislation was passed in response to the advent of controlled car-
riers entering United States trades and siphoning off a large volume of
high-rated cargo from United States flags and other conference mem-
bers by cutting rates up to sixty percent below conference rates.9'
The Act amends section 18 to enable the FMC to:
(1) suspend rates that it finds to be unjust and unreasonable;
(2) place the burden of proof on the carrier to demonstrate that
its rates are reasonable;
(3) use constructive costs rather than actual costs as the basis for
determining unreasonableness, and define the elements to be
used in determining constructive costs;
(4) issue orders to controlled carriers to show cause why their
rates, charges, classifications, rules, or regulations should not
be disapproved; and
(5) suspend such tariffs for a maximum period of 180 days.92
Other provisions of the Act authorize the President of the United States
to permanently stay any FMC order of suspension or final order of
disapproval, if the President deems such action necessary for reasons of
national defense or foreign policy, and to exempt certain controlled
carriers.9 3
b. The Shipping Act Amendments of 197994
These amendments, also referred to as the Anti-Rebating Bill,
tion of PMA members that was challenged. The Supreme Court found that the assessment
formula was a "cooperative working agreement" within the literal language of section 15. Id.
89 Pub. L. No. 95-483, 92 Stat. 1607 (1978).
90 Id. § 2, 92 Stat. at 1607 (amending 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1976)).
91 SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, OCEAN SHIPPING ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 1260, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
92 Ocean Shipping Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-483, § 3, 92 Stat. 1607 (amending 46 U.S.C.
§ 817 (1976)).
93 Id.
94 Pub. L. No. 96-25, 93 Stat. 71 (1979).
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were passed after similar legislation was pocket vetoed by President
Carter in 1978."s The purposes of the Anti-Rebating Bill are to
strengthen the penalties for illegal rebating96 and increase the FMC's
power to enforce anti-rebating provisions,9 7 thereby reducing the eco-
nomic incentive for carriers to resort to such tactics and equalizing dis-
parity in enforcement as between United States flags and foreign
flags.98 The major provisions of the Anti-Rebating Bill include:
(1) substantial increases in civil penalties for malpractices;99
(2) FMC authority to initiate investigations into malpractices on
its own motion, assess its own penalties, and suspend any
tariffs filed with it by carriers who have violated the Act;' 0
and
(3) requiring from the chief executive officer of every vessel oper-
ating as a common carrier in United States waterborne for-
eign commerce, written certification attesting to the shipping
company's policies, and efforts designed to prevent or correct
illegal rebating and agreeing to cooperate fully with FMC
anti-rebating investigations.' 0 '
According to the FMC, the bill has proven to be the "effective
deterrent to malpractices in [United States] foreign commerce that the
commission hoped it would be."'
0t 2
III. ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS PLAGUING THE INDUSTRY
The developments in the law examined above have not taken
place in a vacuum. The United States shipping industry as a whole has
been sinking. In 1978, of the total cargo tonnage moving in United
95 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 19; H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2, at 25.
96 Rebates are secret kickbacks to shippers. They are used to attract cargo when the trade is
overtonnaged. Due to serious overtonnaging of United States trades, the practice was rampant
among United States flags and foreign flags. Sections 16 and 18(b)(3) make it unlawful for any
common carrier in United States liner trades to permit transportation at less than the published
rates on file with the FMC. 46 U.S.C. §§ 815, 817 (1976). Violations are called malpractices, of
which rebates are one example. The legislative history of the Anti-Rebating Bill contains an ex-
cellent discussion of rebating and its causes. See H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2, at 7-11.
97 H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2, at 2.
98 United States carriers were being investigated and fined while foreign carriers could evade
FMC enforcement attempts because of blocking statutes in their home nations. Id. at 2.
99 Shipping Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-25, §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 93 Stat. 71, 71-72
(amending 46 U.S.C. §§ 815, 817, 820, 821 (1976)).
100 Id. § 5, 93 Stat. at 72 (amending 46 U.S.C. § 821 (1976)).
101 Id. § 4, 93 Stat. at 71 (amending 46 U.S.C. § 820 (1976)).
102 PROPELLER CLUB OF THE UNITED STATES, AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS 32 (address of John D. Hardy, Staff Counsel, Senate Subcomm. on Merchant
Marine and Tourism) [hereinafter cited as MARINE CONFERENCE].
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States waterborne foreign trade, United States flag ships carried 2.8%
of tanker service, 1.6% in non-liner service, and 28.6% in liner serv-
ice. 103 Recently, the share of United States flags in liner service has
fallen to 27%.11 Notwithstanding this decline, the liner industry is the
strongest element in the United States shipping force. This section is
devoted to answering the question: How have we allowed a national
asset as valuable as the United States Merchant Marine to reach the
brink of extinction?
A. Antitrust Implications
Antitrust liability has contributed to the general malaise of the in-
dustry. Imposition of antitrust liability discriminates against United
States flags because United States antitrust laws cannot be effectively
applied to foreign flags. 105 Application of antitrust laws would require
the cooperation of the nation whose flag the carrier flies. However,
thirteen United States trading partners have enacted blocking statutes,
legislation which prohibits their carriers from complying with requests
for or subpoenas of documents by United States courts and agencies. 106
103 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note I, at 253. Non-liner or bulk carriers and tankers carry
raw materials for the nation's industries and the oil to fuel them. If their transport is impeded, the
United States economy and security would be seriously imperiled. Id. at 63. This would occur
because the United States is dependent upon foreign sources for 68 of 71 strategic materials (in-
cluding ore for steel, bauxite for aluminum, and tungsten for missile components) of which less
than 2% arrive in this country on United States flag ships. MARINE CONFERENCE, supra note 102,
at 9 (address of C. William Neuhauser, Executive Secretary, National Maritime Council). See
MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 336, for a table of essential materials produced in the
United States and those imported into the United States.
104 TRAFFIC WORLD, Oct. 20, 1980, at 34 (statement of Samuel R. Nemirow, Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs).
105 H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2, at 2-4; Mason, The Relationship and Parallel Development
of Economic Regulation and Antitrust Enforcement in the Ocean Common Carrier Industry, in
LINER SHIPPING, supra note 4, at 2; MARINE CONFERENCE, supra note 102, at 9. See also Agman,
supra note 14, at 24 n.26.
106 H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2; LINER SHIPPING, supra note 4, at 37-38 (address of Sena-
tor Daniel K. Inouye). In this connection, Senator Inouye stated: "Recently, at hearings before
my subcommittee, in response to our specific inquiry the governments of Japan and Israel made it
quite clear that they would not permit their national-flag operators to produce any documents
which the FMC might request in a rebate investigation." Id. at 38.
A number of other countries-Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece,
India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
Yugoslavia-have protested orders made by United States courts for production of evidence lo-
cated abroad. Id. at 73.
For a discussion of various blocking laws, see B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 315-342 (1979); Pettit & Styles, The
International Response to the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus.
LAw. 697 (1982). See Samie, Extraterritorial Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws: The
British Reaction, 16 INT'L LAW. 313 (1982), for a discussion of the Protection of Trading Interest
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Any attempt to obtain these documents is viewed as an invasion of
national sovereignty because the United States is attempting to apply
its domestic regulation to international shipping, an area involving ac-
tivities and persons subject to the sovereignty of other nations' 0 7 This
problem is exacerbated by the fact that most other nations have totally
exempted their shipping industries from operation of anti-cartel
legislation.0 8
Antitrust principles preclude the use of various methods of pro-
moting cooperation between the United States government, shipown-
ers, and shippers. The concept of freedom of the seas, under which the
world's major ports would be open to ships of all nations so that they
could compete equally for the world's trade,0 9 is largely defunct. In
virtually every other country in the world, "the amount of cargo han-
dled and the promotion of indigenous flag fleets is a partnership effort
between the fleet of each country and its government."" 0° This partner-
ship generally takes the form of cargo preference laws which require
that a certain percentage of the country's foreign trade be carried by its
national flag fleet."' AltHough international law prohibits cargo pref-
erence, this principle is nbt reflected in practice, and disregard for it is
becoming the dominant view."
t2
Foreign governments also encourage (or require) their shippers to
use national flags. This show of support engenders cooperation be-
tween shippers and shipowners.' 13 The lack of such support by United
Act, which the author characterizes as the "strongest action taken by a government to resist for-
eign pressures and foreign government policy 'encroachment' in its territory." Id. at 313.
107 Payne, International Implications of U.S. Maritime Policy: Are We Exporting U.S. Antitrust
Policy?, in LINER SHIPPING, supra note 4, at 72-74. In fact, it has been said that "no other major
maritime power has gone as far in extending the authority of its laws over international shipping."
Note, Cargo Preference: The United States and the Future Regulation of International Shipping, 16
VA. J. INT'L L. 865 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Cargo Preferences]. See also Pettit & Styles,
supra note 106, at 698.
108 For example, Germany has created an exemption through positive legislation, while the
Common Market has a defacto practice of not intervening in the operation of conferences.
Gleiss, Evolution of Market Structure, Conferences, Pooling Agreements, Consortia, and the Euro-
pean Antitrust Laws, in LINER SHIPPING, supra note 4, at 19-21.
109 For the early success of this concept, see S. LAWRENCE, supra note 13, at 7.
110 MARINE CONFERENCE, supra note 102, at 10 (address of W. Bruce Seaton, President, Amer-
ican President Lines).
III For a listing of cargo reservation and similar preferential laws of foreign nations, see MARI-
TIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 211-47. For percentages of each country's foreign trade carried
by national flag fleets, see id. at 50. See also infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text. The
United States has similar laws, though they are not strictly enforced. MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra
note 1, at 25, 89. For a thorough catalogue of such laws, see id. at 3-21.
112 Note, Cargo Preferences, supra note 107, at 881-87.
113 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 71.
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States shippers for United States flags is regarded by industry members
as a major problem." 4 Additionally, however, without government
support, antitrust policies preclude cooperation and rationalization at
levels which exist in other countries."l
5
Shippers' councils-shippers organized to negotiate with confer-
ences over rates and general needs of shippers-are another potential
cooperative device which could foster a community of interest between
shippers and carriers. 16 Formation of shippers' councils, however, is
also prevented by antitrust policies although other major maritime na-
tions recognize their efficacy." 7 The lack of shippers' councils may not
be deemed urgent by large shippers, who probably have some negotiat-
ing leverage, but they would be advantageous to smaller shippers. I"
The prohibition of closed conferences is directly attributable to an-
titrust principles. 19 Open conferences mean that foreign flags can
service United States ports at will, which often leads to overtonnaging.
In the 1970s, instability in world trade led to overtonnaging throughout
the world. Shipping companies, which were not forced to suspend op-
erations, moved to United States trades to attract high-valued cargo.
As a result of this influx of carriers, United States flag shipping was hit
especially hard. 20 A more recent threat posed by open conferences is
the entry of state-controlled carriers in world trade. These carriers do
not operate in pursuit of profit. Rather, they exist to promote their
country's national shipping policies and to earn foreign exchange. 12 1
By cutting their rates up to sixty percent below conference rates, state-
controlled carriers have. siphoned off high-rated freight. 2 2 In 1979,
nineteen state-controlled carriers operated in United States trades.'
23
Of those, the Soviet carriers were the principal competitors on United
States liner trade routes to countries other than the Soviet Union.' 24 In
114 Jessen, Ails that Shrunk the Mightiest Ocean Fleet, DISTR., Oct. 1980, at 36; MARITIME IN-
DUSTRY, supra note 1, at 64.
115 See infra notes 169-89 and accompanying text.
116 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 82-83.
117 Agman, supra note 14, at 34-43; Butler, Ocean Shippers, Carriers Offer Legislative Options,
Suggestions, TRANSPORTATION WEEK, Mar. 10, 1980, at 40 (comments of J. F. Muheim, Chair-
man, European Shippers' Council).
118 Butler, supra note 117, at 40; MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 84.
119 H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2 at 8; S. REP. No. 1260, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
120 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 80; Gallagher, Ocean Conferences in Upheaval, HAN-
DLING & SHIPPING MGT., May, 1980, at 48. For definition of high-rated freight, see supra note 21.
121 S. REP. No. 1260, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-18 (1978); MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at
81.
122 S. REP. No. 1260, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
123 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at XXVI.
124 Id.
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United States trades, they carried 3.5% of total liner tonnage and they
are becoming increasingly competitive.'25
The antitrust laws also have a chilling effect on the United States
shipping industry. Parties are reluctant to seek section 15 approval of
agreements found necessary in United States trades. 126 There is uncer-
tainty over what effect FMC approval has. As discussed above, 27 con-
ference members have been faced with retroactive antitrust liability
when they thought they were operating within the parameters of an
approved agreement. Thus, the advantage of immunity which is sup-
posed to accompany FMC approval may be illusory. However, not
seeking approval may be advantageous-with no record of the agree-
ment, it may be more difficult to prove an antitrust violation. This par-
adoxical result is at odds with the Shipping Act's requirement of
disclosure of all conference agreements.
The shipping industry is capital intensive. An extensive capital
outlay is necessary to enter the industry and to keep abreast of techno-
logical developments. 28 This factor provides a barrier to entry, espe-
cially since the industry is not very profitable. 29 Potential antitrust
liability may also deter entry. In the words of one industry member:
"We feel strongly that a carrier such as Great Lakes and European
Lines would never have gone into the business without the protection
of the Shipping Act of 1916. This is a vital statutory umbrella to any
carrier operating in our trade."' 30 This is true because a carrier in liner
125 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 24; S. REP. No. 1260, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
The legislative history of the Controlled Carrier Bill is in large part devoted to the dangers inher-
ent in Soviet penetration of United States trades. Id. at 3-19. See discussion of the Controlled
Carrier Bill, supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
126 Butler, supra note 117, at 39 (address of Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Democrat, Hawaii).
127 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
128 H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2, at 8; MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 45-64; D.
MARX, supra note 9, at 19-25.
129 One commentator states:
Contrasted with other industries reported in the then current Standard & Poor's Comparative
Financial Analysis of American Industry, American liner shipping over the seven-year period
1956-1962 had experienced: an average return on common equity of 6% for a standing of
47th out of the top 50 industry groups which had a composite average of 11%; an average
return on invested capital of 5% for a standing of 50th out of 50 which had a composite
average of 50%; an average generation of dividends of 2.2% for a standing of 50th out of 50
which had a composite average of 5.9%; and a price earnings ratio of 7.6 for a standing of
73rd out of the top 74 industries which had a composite average of 16.6.
* * * Only twice (1964 and 1966) in the period 1964-1973 did the subsidized segment of
the industry appear to show an average annual return on investment greater than. . . 5%
... . The unsubsidized portion of the industry, after several good years in the late-Sixties
when the.. . companies. . . experienced returns on investment between 15-20%, has more
currently fallen to returns below 5% in the 1971-1973 period.
Agman, supra note 14, at 42 (footnotes omitted).
130 Shioping Act Amendments of 1977- Hearings on S. 2008 Before the Subcomm. on Merchant
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service makes a long-term commitment to the trade route upon which it
operates. This commitment is based upon the ability to consistently
attract sufficient cargo to cover initial outlays and fixed costs. This is
precisely the kind of stability that the conference system provides.
That stability is necessary because shipping lines cannot simply pull up
their stakes and go elsewhere, as that also involves great costs.' 3 1 Thus,
if the conference is undermined, so are the advantages which it was
designed to secure, including the basis for entering and engaging in
research and development. 32 Without the stability of the conference
system, the risks would greatly exceed subsequent benefits.
The case law development illuminates the practical impact of the
antitrust laws upon the regulatory scheme. 33 The Cunard134 and Far
East 3 5 cases established that the remedy for unapproved agreements
had to be found within the provisions of the Shipping Act, not the anti-
trust laws. When Isbrandtsen 136 held that carriers utilizing the dual
rate system would be subject to antitrust liability because the FMC
lacked the power to approve such agreements, Congress responded by
legalizing dual rate contracts. 137 The 1961 Amendments restored the
antitrust exemption. 138 The restoration, however, was short-lived. In
Carnation,39 the Supreme Court held that action taken under rate-
making agreements not filed with or approved by the FMC was subject
to antitrust liability. Although in Cunard and Far East the Court had
refused to grant injunctive relief because it might create conflict be-
tween the courts and the FMC's exercise of its powers, the Court saw
no such conflict in the case of retroactive treble damages. 140 After Car-
nation, if conference action was subsequently found to be outside the
scope of an approved agreement, the antitrust exemption was inappli-
cable because the FMC could not approve agreements which violated
the Act. Therefore, the conference would be subject to the full impact
of the antitrust laws. This development subjects the conference to un-
Marine and Tourism of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
126 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2008].
131 H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2, at 9; D. MARX, supra note 9, at 14, 19; Kryvoruka, Ameri-
can Ocean Shipping and the Antitrust Laws Revisited, 11 J. MAR. L. & COM. 67, 73-74 (1979).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
133 See supra notes 59-88 and accompanying text.
134 United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
135 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
136 Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen, 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
137 Act of October 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-346, 75 Stat. 762.
138 Id.
139 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966).
140 Id. at 220; Llorca, supra note 66, at 296 n.64.
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reasonable peril since in approving agreements the FMC is "not bound
by strict stare decisis; [thus,] an action taken in full accord with then
current pronouncements of the agency might nevertheless, through the
shifting sands of the agency's deliberations, be found to violate the
Act." 
41
In Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika
Linien,42 the Supreme Court accepted the FMC's interpretation of the
public interest standard of section 15 as including antitrust considera-
tions. As proof that it was not bound by precedent, the FMC's own
interpretation reversed fifty years of agency determinations. 143 Under
this new standard, an agreement which may violate the antitrust laws is
substantial evidence that the agreement is contrary to the public inter-
est.144 The conference must then "bring forth such facts as would
demonstrate that the. . . rule was required by a serious transportation
need, necessary to secure important public benefits or in furtherance of
a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act."'
145
This standard is a contortion of the language of section 15.146 In
order to secure the advantages which the conference system offered
over free competition, 47 section 15 was weighted in favor of approval.
Thus, the FMC was directed to approve all agreements which were not
unjustly discriminatory or unfair, detrimental to United States com-
merce, contrary to the public interest, or in violation of the Shipping
Act. Section 15 does not speak in terms of serious transportation needs,
important public benefits, or valid regulatory purposes. 48 Yet, by im-
posing this standard, the FMC regards every agreement filed as pre-
sumptively contrary to the public interest. 149 This is an anomalous
result since the type of agreement to be approved under section 15 was
found necessary to secure advantages to the public and permit the
United States flag fleet to operate on a parity with foreign carrier's. The
effect is that conferences operate at their peril in performing the very
141 Mason, The Relationship and Parallel Development of Economic Regulation and Antitrust
Enforcement in the Ocean Common Carrier Industry, in LINER SHIPPING, supra note 4, at 9.
142 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
143 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
144 Svenska, 390 U.S. at 246.
145 Id. at 244. See also supra note 87.
146 See supra note 54 for the relevant language of section 15.
147 For a discussion of the benefits, see supra text accompanying notes 34-42. This view was
reaffirmed in the 1961 Amendments. S. REP. No. 860, supra note 72, at 4-5, 10.
148 Svenska, 390 U.S. at 244. See also supra note 87.
149 See Pacific Westbound Conference-Application to Extend its Exclusive Patronage Con-
tract System to include its OCP Territory, 18 F.M.C. 308, 319 (1975). See also Fawcett & Nolan,
supra note 70, at 556-65; Comment, Antitrust and the Shipping Industry, supra note 14.
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activities for which they were organized-collective action with an-
ticompetitive effects. That this is not the result Congress intended is
evidenced by the fact that attempts to infuse antitrust standards into
the approval process were expressly rejected. 5 ' The legislative history
of the 1961 Amendments demonstrates that Congress did not intend to
narrow the conferences' antitrust exemption. 
5 t
A more curious trend is the interference of the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ). Aside from appearing regularly before the FMC to chal-
lenge agreements proposed by United States flags, the DOJ has begun
to challenge approved agreements in court. In United States v. Federal
Maritime Commission, 52 the DOJ challenged a revenue pooling agree-
ment approved by the FMC. The FMC was vindicated since its deci-
sion was supported by substantial evidence. However, the important-
indeed startling-holding was that the DOJ had standing, since the
FMC's order "created an injury in fact to the [DOJ] in that [FMC ap-
proval] ...directly interferes with the [DOJ's] responsibility to en-
force the antitrust laws. . ." and "that this interest [is] within the zone
of interests sought to be protected by the Shipping Act, 1916."l As
the separate concurrence pointed out, Congress necessarily intended
that the DOJ be ousted of any supervisory role over the FMC by pro-
viding that the FMC alone had the power to approve section 15 agree-
ments. 154  The agencies operate under two very different statutory
150 SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, INDEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STEAMSHIP
CONFERENCE/DUAL RATE LAW, S. DoC. No. 100, supra note 73, at 264-66, 399-401, 476-82. The
insertion of the language "is intended or will be reasonably likely to cause the exclusion of an-
other carrier in the trade" was rejected as destructive of the very purpose of the Shipping Act. Id.
The reason for exclusion was that the amendment "would, if included in the bill, destroy it, be-
cause by means of this bill we are authorizing a conference system; and a conference system has a
tendency to eliminate and reduce competition. We know that. That is precisely what we are
doing." Id. at 399 (remarks of Senator Engle).
151 Senator Russell Long stated the majority position:
Senators must realize that the pattern that is necessary to engage in ocean commerce does not
fit into the pattern of our Antitrust Division, composed of lawyers who would like to regulate
a farm cooperative as though it were the Standard Oil of New Jersey ...
Now it is proposed by one of the Kefauver amendments that action cannot be taken by a
conference if the total effect would be reasonably likely to cause the exclusion of any other
carrier from the trade.
Yet the whole idea of the bill is to let those people get together on rates and compete
with the people who are not in the agreement. If one fellow will not join and will not partici-
pate, the others are by necessity in price competition with him. He is trying to put the other
fellows out of business. What is wrong with the other fellows trying to put him out of
business?
Id. at 3.
152 655 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
153 Id. at 251.
154 Id. at 255 (Markey, J., concurring in result only).
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mandates. The DOJ, however, is trying to impose its mandate upon
the FMC by injecting competition into an industry where competition
will not work. Congress has affirmed and reaffirmed the necessity of
anticompetitive arrangements in the shipping industry. This is pre-
cisely the reason why Congress has not chosen to incorporate antitrust
considerations into the Shipping Act. And, "[u]nless it be said that the
FMC's [section] 15 agreement approvals serve no governmental inter-
ests, DOJ's assertion of standing reduces to the absurd."' 5 5 The real
issue this case presents-which agency's view of the antitrust laws and
the public interest will prevail-should be resolved by Congress, not
the courts. Congress made its choice by refusing to require the FMC to
include antitrust considerations when approving section 15 agreements.
In 1977, the DOJ published a report containing proposals for al-
tering or eliminating the Shipping Act.'56 The first proposal called for
repeal of the Shipping Act.'57 This would subject United States flags to
the full impact of unexportable antitrust laws,'58 as well as discrimina-
tory practices of foreign conferences without the ability to fight back.
The DOJ recognized that this solution would be "politically unpalat-
able,"' 59 but set it forth nonetheless. The increased vulnerability of
United States flags from such a repeal would probably drive the al-
ready sinking industry completely under the waves. The DOJ Report
further suggests the return of Isbrandtsen by repealing section 14b'
60
(which legalizes dual rate contracts) or modifying it to increase the
level of competition from independents,' 6' enacting a competitive im-
155 Id. at 255 n.5.
156 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE REGULATED OCEAN SHIPPING INDUSTRY (1977) [here-
inafter cited as DOJ REPORT]. The Report has been labelled factually incorrect by one commen-
tator. Payne, International Implications of U.S. Maritime Policy: Are We Exporting U.S. Antitrust
Policy?, in LINER SHIPPING, supra note 4, at 74.
157 DOJ REPORT, supra note 156, at 240.
158 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
159 DOJ REPORT, supra note 156, at 244.
160 Id. at 244-45.
161 The modifications would take the following forms:
1. Reducing liquidated damages under 14b(5) for violation of a dual rate contract from the
conference freight rate less handling to a maximum of one and one half times the difference
between the conference and independent rates;
2. Reducing the notice period shippers must give before withdrawing from the contract
under 14b(6) to 15 or 30 days from 90 days;
3. Reducing the rate differential in 14b(7) from the present 15% to 10%;
4. Removing the burden of proving the unreasonableness of rate differentials from opposing
parties and imposing that burden upon the proponents; and,
5. Ensuring that the use of dual rate contracts does not extend to intermodal shipping (i.e.,
where shipping is only one leg of the goods' journey).
Id. at 246-48.
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pact standard to strengthen Svenska, t62 requiring approved agreements
to expire periodically, 163 removing the conference self-policing sys-
tem,164 prohibiting all pooling agreements, 1 65 and repealing section 15's
authorization of interconference agreements.1
66
It is evident that the DOJ is simply "unwilling to accept the Ship-
ping Act as the law of the land,"' 167 and is now endeavoring to win in
the courts a role that Congress has consistently withheld from it.'
68
Courts should not tolerate this type of overt interdepartmental squab-
ble. Despite the DOJ's dislike of the Shipping Act, it is not justified in
attempting to undermine the authority of the FMC. In a recent case
where the FMC and DOJ appeared as respondents, the DOJ adopted a
position directly opposed to that of the FMC. "The DOJ characterized
the [FMC's] rationale as a 'product not only of incomplete analysis, but
even more of self-induced myopia.' ",169 It is this author's view that the
DOJ's own myopic views prevent it from accepting that it has no role
to play in the Shipping Act's regulatory scheme. Failure to recognize
this seriously impairs the ability of the FMC to carry out its statutory
mandate, and, more importantly, impedes the ability of carriers to op-
erate under some semblanceof regulatory certainty.
B. Changes in the Competitive Environment
Over the years, considerable change has taken place in the com-
petitive environment in which United States flags must operate. Legis-
lation has lagged behind these changes. The most important change
has been increasing cooperation between foreign nations and shippers
with their national flag fleets. 170  There are several aspects to such
cooperation.
First, the principle of freedom of the seas has given way to the
162 Id. at 248-50.
163 Id. at 250-51.
164 Id. at 251-52.
165 Id. at 252-53. Pooling agreements are agreements to pool (or share) the available traffic,
gross freight monies, or net freight earnings. Each member is entitled to a percentage (based on
size or number of sailings) of the pool. Some conferences require the posting of a performance
bond which may be forfeited if the agreement is violated. D. MARX, supra note 9, at 54.
166 DOJ REPORT, supra note 156, at 253-54. For a more detailed discussion of the DOJ Report,
see Kryvoruka, supra note 131.
167 Hearings on S. 2008, supra note 130, at 78 (testimony of Richard J. Daschback, Chairman,
Federal Maritime Commission).
168 H.R. REP. No. 498, supra note 72, at 12-13; S. REP. No. 860, supra note 72, at 2.
169 National Association of Recycling Industries v. Federal Maritime Commission, 658 F.2d
816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
170 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. See also E. FRANKEL, REGULATION AND
POLICIES OF AMERICAN SHIPPING 194-95 (1982).
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practice of requiring that a certain percentage of a nation's foreign
commerce be carried on its own flag ships. Cargo reservation may be
required by legislation or simply be a defacto practice. 17 1 The fact that
ninety-six percent of United States foreign trade is carried by foreign
flags is especially disturbing when the percentage of other countries'
foreign trade carried by their national flag fleets is considered. In 1977,
for example, Canada's flag fleet carried 44.5% of its total imports and
20.7% of total exports, Japan's fleet carried 44.4% of Japanese imports
and 20.9% of its exports, and the United Kingdom's fleet carried 32.9%
of British imports and 40.1% of its exports. In contrast, the United
States flag fleet carried 4.5% of United States imports and 5.6% of its
exports.' 72 The country closest to the United States was Germany, with
14.7% of German imports and 25.4% of its exports.'
73
Part of the problem may be attributable to the fact that the size of
the United States flag fleet is not growing in proportion to the growth in
United States foreign trade.' 74 However, the lack of a national cargo
policy also contributes to the disparity, especially in liner trades.
United States operators in liner service made the most innovative, pro-
ductive and safest general cargo ships in the world available to ship-
pers.' 75  Their freight rates were comparable with those of foreign
competitors. Despite this, patronage from American shippers did not
keep pace with the increasing volume of trade.' 76 The National Mari-
time Council (NMC) has undertaken efforts to garner support for the
United States flag fleet from American shippers. 177 The NMC's efforts
have met with some success, but government support is also needed.
Second, foreign governments highly subsidize their flags. Industry
171 For a listing of preference laws, see MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 211-47. At least
54 nations require by law that preference and or assistance be given to their national flag fleets.
Id. at71.
172 Id. at 50.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 46-47, 63, 70, 191.
175 United States flag innovations revolutionized the industry. For example, the CON-
TAINERSHIP, RO/RO and SEABEE vessels, developed by United States flags in cooperation
with the technical know-how of American shipbuilders, revolutionized the industry by bringing
economies to intermodal transportation. The CONTAINERSHIP permits loading of the whole
railroad car onto the ship, rather than the more costly method of unloading the railroad car and
reloading the cargo onto the ship. RO/ROs (roll-on/roll-off ships) are designed to allow trucks to
drive on with trailers of cargo. SEABEE (sea-barge) ships are barge carrfers. Rather than un-
loading and reloading, the SEABEE ship loads the entire barge onto the ship by using an under-
water elevator. Id. at 51, 58, 207-10.
176 Id. at 191.
177 The NMC was established in 1971. It has become a lobbying body in pursuit of legislation
designed to promote the industry. Id. at 195.
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members cite disparity in subsidization as a major cause of disparity in
competitive ability. 7 ' In the United States, subsidization is aimed at
achieving parity for United States flags; however, this is rarely accom-
plished.'79 For example, the objective of the Operating Differential
Subsidy (ODS) Program is to achieve cost parity in seamen's wages,
vessel insurance, and maintenance repairs not covered by insurance.
This is to ensure that American shippers have regular and frequent
service between the United States and overseas markets at reasonable
and competitive freight rates.1
8 0
The value of government aid granted by each of the major mari-
time nations to their flag fleets and shipbuilding industries is greater
than that of the United States when viewed in relation to the value of
the American Gross National Product or to the value of United States
foreign trade.' 8 ' This is not to say that subsidies should be increased
beyond the level of parity, for subsidization alone does not equal the
ability to compete effectively, nor does it ensure profitability. This is
demonstrated by the fact that the subsidized segment of the fleet is no
more profitable than the non-subsidized segment.'8 2 Indeed, because
of overtonnaging and the severe competition in the Pacific trades over a
period of years, two long-established subsidized shipping companies
were forced into bankruptcy in 1978.183 While there is something to be
said for subsidization, since ships in the non-subsidized segment are on
average twice as old as those in the subsidized segment, the subsidized
segment is also much smaller than the non-subsidized segment. 18 4 As to
the interplay between subsidization and antitrust liability, one com-
mentator maintains:
it makes no sente to spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year to pro-
mote our merchant fleet, on the one hand; if on the other hand, we regu-
late the most lucrative part of our international waterborne commerce-
178 Jessen, supra note 114, at 36.
179 The subsidy program is administered by the Maritime Administration (MARAD).
180 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 33; E. FRANKEL, supra note 170, at 38-40, 44. For a
discussion of other subsidy programs, see MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 30-38. Some
United States flags choose not to accept subsidies because of the obligations which go along with
them. For example, subsidized companies must operate under long-term government-industry
contracts, assume fixed ship replacement obligations, operate under a 25-year ship life limitation,
make predetermined mandatory deposits in capital reserve funds for ship replacement, maintain
extra administrative staffs for government accountability, meet required regular sailings, and sail
even with vacant cargo space. This list is not exhaustive. Id. at 54.
181 Id. at 26, 71. Subsidization may come in forms other than direct monetary aid, e.g., tax
advantages. Id. at 379.
182 Id. at 56-58.
183 Id. at 43, 56. The two companies were Pacific Far East Lines and States Steamship Co.
184 Id. at 57.
The Sinking Shipping Industry
5:99(1983)
the liner trades-in a manner which prevents our merchant fleet from
competing fairly and effectively with foreign-flags." 5
Finally, bilateralism is a developing trend in international ship-
ping. Bilateralism can be defined as agreements between two countries
to reserve carriage of specific cargoes to a designated number of partici-
pants, usually national flag lines.'86 These agreements are legal instru-
ments of the participating governments and specify the commercial
rights and responsibilities of each country's national flag lines in their
bilateral trade.'8 7 Bilateralism is becoming popular as developing na-
tions seek control over the routing of their exports and imports. The
adoption of the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences by the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1973 stimulated the
development of bilateralism.1 88 Among other things, the Code pro-
vides that any country wishing to do so may impose 40/40/20 cargo
sharing in its trades, i.e., each trading partner's national flag ships
would carry forty percent of the liner cargo, leaving twenty percent for
third flag ships.'8 9 The United States opposes ratification of the Code
in its present form, because it would adversely affect the United States
liner industry. 90 However, bilateralism is a force with which the
United States will have to contend at some point.
C. Recent Legislation
Although Congress should be lauded for its attempts to respond to
the problems of rebating and state controlled carriers in United States
trades, legislation directed at single malpractices is not the answer, for
it only serves to further fragment the regulatory scheme. Both the
Ocean Shipping Act of 1978191 and the Anti-Rebating Bill'9 2 suffer
from the same defects, and therefore will be analyzed together. This
legislation contains two major flaws.
185 MARINE CONFERENCE, supra note 102, at 11 (address of John D. Hardy, Staff Counsel,
Senate Subcomm. on Merchant Marine and Tourism). For subsidization expenses, see MARITIME
INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 248.
186 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 21.
187 Id.
188 Ratification was completed when more than 24 countries whose liner tonnage exceeded the
25% of world liner tonnage necessary to bring the Convention into force, ratified the Code. See
MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 21-22; Farthing, UNCT4D Code of Practicefor the Regula-
tion ofLiner Conferences-4nother View, 4 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 467 (1973); Texts and Documents:
Code of Practicefor Conferences, 4 J. MAR. L. & COM. 657 (1973).
189 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note I, at 21-22, 173-74.
190 Id. at 22 n.33.
191 Pub. L. No. 95-483, 92 Stat. 1607 (1978). See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
192 Shipping Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-25, 93 Stat. 71. See supra notes 94-102
and accompanying text.
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First, the legislation attacks only symptoms; it does not get at the
root of the problems, which is the antitrust philosophy underlying the
Shipping Act. The House Committee recognized this fact when consid-
ering the Anti-Rebating Bill, stating:
It is agreed that widespread rebating exists in the U.S. foreign trades.
This condition has developed because:
1. The antitrust philosophy underlying the Shipping Act, 1916, re-
quires open steamship conferences in the U.S. trades.
2. Freedom of entry into our open conferences can result in
overtonnaging ....
3. Overtonnaging in a capital intensive industry, such as the ocean
transportation industry, has encouraged rebates .... 93
Congress has obviously accepted the antitrust philosophy underlying
the Shipping Act. Although the promotion of free competition has ad-
vantages in other industries, it has no place in the shipping industry. It
is time to reexamine these principles. Deterioration of the United
States shipping industry will continue until steps are taken to
strengthen the conference system in United States trades. Most of the
industry's weaknesses are directly attributable to the weak conference
system required by the antitrust laws. The concept of open conferences
heads the list. Open conferences lead to overtonnaging because the
conferences cannot control the amount of cargo space available on the
trade. 194 Overtonnaging, in turn, leads to the rate wars and cutthroat
competition which the conference system was created to eliminate. 195
Thus, United States conferences cannot fulfill their purpose.
Second, there is the problem of enforcing unexportable antitrust
laws. 196 As one commentator has stated, "the issue is better viewed
: . not as one ofpower but as the appropriateness of the exercise of
jurisdiction in light of conflicting national interests." 197 The question is
whether it is appropriate for the United States to impose antitrust lia-
bility upon carriers whose home nations have exempted them from
such liability. The United States may require foreign carriers to oper-
ate under United States laws in return for participating in United
States shipping trades. However, those foreign carriers are acting in
furtherance of their own national shipping policies. United States trad-
ing partners have already shown their displeasure with the balance the
193 H.R. REP. No. 232, supra note 2, at 8, 30.
194 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
197 B. HAWK, APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL SEA AND AIR TRANS-
PORTATION 13 (speech delivered at the ICC Conference in Paris, March, 1981).
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United States has reached between the competing national shipping
policies through their enactment of blocking statutes. Continuing to
follow this policy can only further strain these relationships. It is time
for the United States to reexamine its policy balance, even if the new
balance is not likely to be more acceptable to United States trading
partners than the present balance.
IV. PROPOSALS
The United States should make a serious commitment to revital-
izing the shipping industry. First, the primacy of the Shipping Act as
the basic regulatory scheme must be re-established, and, second, steps
must be taken toward the promotion of the industry.
A. Primacy of the Shipping Act
Industry problems require a comprehensive overhaul of the pres-
ent regulatory scheme, not merely stop-gap measures designed to elimi-
nate specific problems as they arise. Toward that end, Congress should
pass the proposed Shipping Act of 1982 ("1982 Act").198 Congress has
expressed some purposes of the 1982 Act as being: 1) harmonization of
United States shipping practices with those of its major trading part-
ners; 2) cooperation among carriers and rationalization of services;
3) facilitation of efficient and timely regulation by a single federal
agency of the various aspects of international liner shipping, responsive
to the growth of ocean commerce and international developments af-
fecting that comm6rce; and, 4) complete immunity from antitrust laws
for ocean common carriers conducting international liner shipping and
related intermodal activities. 99
The 1982 Act re-establishes the primacy of the Shipping Act of
1916 through several substantive changes °.20  The most important pro-
vision is the new antitrust exemption.20 ' Section 8 of the 1982 Act cre-
ates blanket antitrust immunity for carriers engaged in certain
collective activities.2"2 The 1982 Act is made the sole law governing
international liner shipping; the standards and remedies of the Act are
the only regulations applicable to regulated ocean shipping. Further-
198 S. REP. No. 1593, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
199 Id. at 37.
200 In fact, the Committee Report echoes much of the analysis supra in text accompanying
notes 103-97.
201 S. REP. No. 1593, supra note 198, at 50-52, 55-57.
202 Id. The Senate Committee on Finance and Transportation analysis of the bill states that
the provision is "intended to be a broad exemption." S. REP. No. 414, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34
(1982).
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more, prior FMC approval is not required for conference activity to fall
within the antitrust exemption,20 3 expressly overruling Carnation.20
The broad antitrust exemption of section 8 would free conferences
from the shadow of unexportable antitrust laws.
As noted above, section 6 allows conference agreements to take
effect without prior FMC approval. In addition, to prevent any "op-
portunity for the reinfusion of antitrust principles into the agreement
review process, ' 20 5 that section provides that "[n]either the burden of
proof nor the burden of persuasion shall be shifted solely on the
grounds that the agreement would, absent approval, violate the anti-
trust laws or have significant anticompetitive effects. 2 °6 Section 6 ex-
pressly overrules Svenska 207 by placing the burden of proof on the
opponent throughout the proceedings.
The 1982 Act clarifies conference power to set intermodal rates
and FMC jurisdiction over such rates and services. 20 8 This provision
should put an end to suits such as United States v. Federal Maritime
Commission,2°9 where the DOJ challenged FMC approval of a revenue
pooling agreement. In combination with the broad antitrust exemp-
tion, section 4 should permanently remove interdepartmental squab-
bles from the courts and convince the DOJ that it has no role to play in
regulating the liner shipping industry. Finally, the 1982 Act provides
specific authority for shippers to form shippers' councils without the
threat of antitrust liability for their activities, including consultation
with carriers.210
Shippers' councils are usually used to offset increased conference
power derived from the use of closed conferences. The 1982 Act, how-
ever, retains the requirement of open conferences.21' This is a mistake.
Closed conferences would permit control over the amount of tonnage
in the trade and avoid overtonnaging. Controlling tonnage provides a
stable basis upon which to base estimates of future demand. Carriers
could then intelligently assess the need for new ship construction and
design. The stability produced by closed conferences would create in-
203 S. REP. No. 1593, supra note 198, at 50-52, 55-57.
204 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, modfied, 383 U.S. 932
(1966).
205 S. REP. No. 414, supra note 202, at 32.
206 Id.
207 390 U.S. 238 (1980).
208 S. REP. No. 1593, supra note 198, at 43-44.
209 655 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See also supra text accompanying note 151. Revenue pool-
ing agreements are specifically authorized. S. REP. No. 1593, supra note 198, at 44.
210 S. REP. No. 1593, supra note 198, at 44.
211 Id. at 46-47.
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centives to engage in research and development by assuring an ade-
quate return on investment. The closed conference system would
provide incentive for members to enforce agreements. Since the 1982
Act does not permit closed conferences, it specifically provides that
conferences must employ an "independent neutral body to police fully
the obligations of the conference and its members. 212 The 1982 Act
also retains the prohibition of deferred rebates.2z 3 Under a system of
closed conferences, this would be unnecessary since deferred rebates
are a useful mechanism for ensuring adequate cargo for members. De-
spite these two inadequacies, the 1982 Act finally abandons parochial
and dogmatic views of United States antitrust laws and strikes a new
balance which will enable United States flags to operate on a parity
with foreign competitors. The United States may finally be ready to
join other maritime nations which have seen strong conference systems
work to their advantage.
B. Promotion of the United States Merchant Marine
It has not been a simple task for the United States to live up to the
mandate of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.14 Its Declaration of
Policy states:
It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign
and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant
marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic waterborne commerce and a
substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign com-
merce of the United States and to provide shipping services essential for
maintaining the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce
at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in
time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the
United States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be prac-
ticable, (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types
of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a trained
and efficient citizen personnel, and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities
for shipbuilding and ship repair. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
the United States to foster the development and encourage the mainte-
nance of such a merchant marine.215
To live up to this mandate, the industry must rebuild. Toward that
212 Id.
213 Id. at 69.
214 46 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
215 Id. Congress reaffirmed this policy by passing the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. Pub. L.
No. 91-469, 84 Stat. 1018 (1970) (amending the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, codfled at 46
U.S.C. § 1101 (1936)). See MARITIME INDUSTRY,. supra note 1, at 15, for a discussion of progress
made under the amendments.
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end, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) must receive the neces-
sary resources and support.
Over the past thirty years, the total size of the United States flag
fleet has dropped to 569 ships from 4,000.216 Undoubtedly, this has
contributed to the United States flag fleet's inability to carry more than
a minimal amount of United States trade.
Different forms of subsidization should be used.2 17 For example,
permitting accelerated depreciation of ships would encourage earlier
scrapping of old ships.218 Aids used by foreign countries include trade-
in allowances, official low interest loans, interest subsidies, official loan
guarantees, tax-free reserve funds, and duty free imports of materials
needed for ship construction.2" 9 MARAD should investigate these and
other methods of assisting carriers. Currently, there is no unified voice
to speak for the industry as a whole. MARAD should be the voice of
the government with respect to the promotion and development of the
United States merchant marine. MARAD should receive authoriza-
tion to speak for the government on matters including carriage of gov-
ernment generated cargoes by United States flags and intercourse with
other agencies over policy matters and probable impact on the industry
of proposed courses of action.
CONCLUSION
The recent spot amendments to the Shipping Act cannot remedy
the problem of outdated and fragmented legislation. Congress must re-
establish the supremacy of the Shipping Act over antitrust laws through
appropriate legislation. The Shipping Act of 1982 is a significant step
away from parochial views of the United States antitrust laws, and,
therefore, it should be passed. This Act would finally bring the regula-
tion of liner shipping under the control of a single federal agency, the
FMC. Moreover, the 1982 Act provides sufficiently broad antitrust im-
munity to permit conferences to carry out the kind of anticompetitive
activities for which they were created. However, the United States
shipping industry still needs to be rebuilt. MARAD may reach this
goal by receiving the support and resources necessary to investigate
and implement new forms of subsidization and cooperation.
216 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 259.
217 For a discussion of current subsidization, see Caras, U.S. Maritime Administration Financing
Procedures Available for New Ship Construction, 36 Bus. LAw. 1887 (1981).
218 MARITIME INDUSTRY, supra note 1, at 379-80. Reinvestment in new ships must coincide
with scrapping old ships to prevent a decrease in size since the thrust of this proposal is to upgrade
the quality and efficiency of the current United States fleet.
219 Id. at 26 n.42.
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Only the development of a coordinated national shipping and
cargo policy can rejuvenate the United States shipping industry. Such
a policy would permit greater rationalization and make United States
carriers more competitive with foreign carriers. Until the United States
abandons its parochial regulation of the shipping industry and adopts a
policy of cooperation and rationalization, as have other major mari-
time nations, the United States shipping industry will continue its dan-
gerous decline.
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